The "New Terror" and the Harms of Asymmetrical Warfare

Terrorism in the modern sense, if arguably grounded in the same ideology as more historical veins, still plays a much more aggressive role in shaping world politics today. In the past, “terrorists” were non-state actors who were incapable of causing significant harm to the affairs of the state. This was primarily due in part to these groups’ lack of organization and resources. Even the most prominent examples, such as the infamous Gunpowder Plot, failed to incur any sort of radical change in public policy.

Current forms of terrorism have taken a radical shift from this historic failing. In part due to the growing availability of mass media coverage, acts of terrorism now command a much higher audience than before. Part of this has to do with the rise of mass media and the spread of global news platforms. Furthermore, as stated in Terrorism & the Media, a publication by the European Union-financed research project Transnational Terrorism, Security & the Rule of Law, “Today, for all of us – and more often than we acknowledge it – the desire to be entertained takes over the need to know.” (Ockrent 2006, 77). And this leads to a focus on human interest and drama rather than “hard” news stories. This “lust” for human interest stories and drama can lead to overcoverage [sic] of terrorist activities.”

This current growth in visibility, coupled with the rising interconnectedness of world markets, means that terrorists now command a much higher output of power than before. For the price of a few explosives, even the most rag-tag group can get their message splashed across the evening news. This shift in the balance of power is paralleled by states’ transforming modes of warfare. The time of constant state vs. state warfare is quickly becoming obsolete. Without state aggressors to contend with, governments have now turned to a distinctly different enemy – the non-state terrorist actor.

The clearest example of this is obviously the United States’ “War on Terror,” a textbook example of asymmetrical warfare. This example fulfills the basic tenets for asymmetrical warfare – a major state actor, with a fully equipped, tax-payer funded military, fighting a decentralized group of individuals that blends easily into the populace. This type of warfare would have been unheard of a century ago – the idea of a state committing major resources towards fighting a terrorist network would have seemed ludicrous in the days of Guy Fawkes. In this vein, one can see the obvious growth in terrorists’ relative power. By hijacking several commercial airplanes, Al Qaeda was able to essentially shape the entirety of US foreign policy for the next several years. Regardless of what critics have to say about the power of terrorist networks, the fact of the matter is they managed to command about one-third of the US Defense Department’s budget.

This rise in asymmetrical warfare is not without costs however. Pitting massive state militaries against relatively tiny non-states is always bound to lead to outsize losses. But the most disturbing effect of asymmetrical warfare is the rise in civilian casualties. The most distinct trait about terrorist networks is their tendency to use guerilla tactics in fighting. This strategy of blending in with the populace creates an advantaged out of what was originally a handicap of these organizations – their inability to commit hand to hand combat on the traditional battlefield. However, this growing use of civilian as “camouflage” has led to many states adopting war strategies that disregard the rules of the fourth Geneva Convention, which stipulates that no civilians may be deliberately harmed in the course of conflict. Unable to discern who the enemy is and who is a civilian, state military forces are increasingly taking a “bomb-them-all” strategy.

However, this is not the only factor behind the rise of civilian casualties. Many terrorist organizations, faced with an increasing burden of warfare that has never existed in the past, are turning to more controversial, such as the use child soldiers and forced recruitment. In the past, most terrorist cells could be adequately described as freedom fighters, groups of people united by a single radical ideology. However, these groups often did not have the sort of resources available to commit to prolonged battle with a state actor. Now, while most terrorist groups have slightly more power available to them, they do not have enough resources to combat a taxpayer funded military for a long period of time, which has led to the use of these controversial methods.

The cost of asymmetrical warfare can thus be measured by these two distinct scales. Citizens are first impacted by attacks meant for terrorist actors supposedly hiding within their ranks. This is then compounded by reactionary tactics by the terrorist networks, which often impose equally harsh punishments on the local populace. An example of this is the recently ended civil war in Sri Lanka. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, also known as the Tamil Tigers or LTTE, were a radical group created in response to what they saw as discriminatory measures on behalf of the Sri Lankan government against the Tamils, an ethnic minority group in Sri Lanka. These measures included a government aided attacking of Tamil civilians in what became known as the Black July riots in 1983, in what would come to be seen as the starting point in a decades long civil war. However, while the Tamil Tigers originally started out as a ‘liberation’ movement, claiming to be fighting for a sovereign Tamil homeland in the north of the country, their benefit for the ethnic Tamil population is questionable at best. The group’s usage of guerilla tactic led in part to a government sponsored brutalizing of Tamil populations in the name of “flushing out the enemy.” Furthermore, ethnic Tamils faced the worry of forced recruitment into the front, with many children and especially boys ‘disappearing’ into the movement. The result was a ravaged ethnic population that was caught between a rock and a hard place – a government that didn’t trust them or “freedom fighters” that needed suicide bombers.

It is cases like this that make the case for asymmetrical warfare much more difficult. At least in state vs. state warfare, the rules of battle are clearly delineated. Asymmetrical warfare does away with distinction between soldier and citizen, creating a state of constant warfare that permeates all of society. The result is unfortunate for both sides – the state expends more money than ever on fighting an enemy it can’t see and the organization fails to get its ideological aims realized. However, the true victims are the populace, who are faced to deal with a new form of warfare that fails to dissipate.

Works Cited

Herber , David. "Guy Fawkes: A Biography." Brittania History. Brittania, 2007. Web. 23 Oct 2011. .

"Terrorism & Media." Transnational Terrorism, Security & the Rule of Law. 6.4 (2008): 15. Web. 23 Oct. 2011. .

"Department of Defense Timeline."Defense Department . Department of Defense, O7 May 2009. Web. 23 Oct 2011. .

"The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Their Protocols."International Committee of the Red Cross. International Committee of the Red Cross, 06 Oct 2011. Web. 23 Oct 2011. .

"Complete Timeline." Peace and Conflict Timeline. PACT, 22 Oct 2009. Web. 23 Oct 2011. .

The ETA: What happens next?

As I’m sure everyone has heard, Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, the ousted former dictator of Libya, has been killed. Now there is an end in sight for the Libyan revolution, and hopefully this marks the first step toward a new, stable democracy in the region. This news of course dominated the headlines, and continues to do so. But, another major event on the world stage also happened this week. The Euskadi Ta Askatasuna, a Basque region separatist organization, declared this week that they would no longer use violent tactics to get what they want. In class, we focused a lot on Joshua Goldstein’s video “Peace is Increasing”. The general consensus was that peace was not really increasing, but the way we fight wars was. Massive countries no longer fight each other, but fight wars they can decisively win. These wars are often fought against small groups of people who cling to a few central ideas, groups just like the ETA. But, these groups do not usually just abandon their tactics so easily as the ETA did, so what was different with them? Is this a sign that peace really is increasing? These questions are front and center in the minds of most IR scholars. In order to understand what is going on here, we need to first look at the history behind this violent group, and try to see what motivates them to commit terrible attacks on innocent civilians.

The ETA has had a very intricate history, starting at a period with high support but they eventually lost most of what they had. Their history began in the late 1950’s when Spain was still under the iron fist of Francisco Franco, a dictator who greatly suppressed the Basque region’s culture and language (Mail & Guardian). In 1966, the organization split into two main factions: ETA-V-“the nationalists” who continued to pursue the goal of Basque sovereignty, and ETA-VI- “the ideologists” who thought that the future Basque state should have Marxist leanings and engaged in sabotage to attain their goals (Encyclopedia Britannica). Over the next few decades, ETA was plagued by fractionalization and constant assaults by authorities (Encyclopedia Britannica). Eventually, they were reduced to relying on extortion, kidnappings, and robberies to get the funding they needed to continue their attacks (Encyclopedia Britannica). Along with their reduced income, support from the public was also waning. In 1997, ETA members kidnapped a local counselor Miguel Angel Blanco, and demanded that 460 prisoners be released for his safe return (BBC). Their demands were not met, and Blanco was found shot twice in the head, eventually dying from his wounds (BBC). The response from the public was enormous. Over the next few days, more than six million Spaniards took to the streets to demand an end to ETA violence (BBC). The next year, the ETA declared an indefinite ceasefire (BBC). Unfortunately, this ceasefire ended after another year because of the Spanish government’s unwillingness to discuss ETA’s demands for an independent Basque nation (BBC). The group remained mostly quiet until 2006, when they car bombed a Madrid parking garage, killing two bystanders (BBC). Since then, eight people have been murdered by the ETA (BBC). Now, this recent declaration has brought the group into the spotlight again, as the world wonders if this time they will truly remain peaceful.

This new declaration can go one of two ways, either this marks the end of over 50 years of violence, or the ETA is going to revert back to their old ways fairly soon. The majority of the evidence points to the latter. First of all, they have already declared “peace” twice in their history, and both times they went back to using violent tactics relatively quickly. John Burns points out that “[The] ETA did not say it would disarm, dissolve or renounce the goal of independence — and experts cautioned that many problems would have to be resolved before peace could be secured” (New York Times). The ETA can reverse this declaration for whatever reason, whenever they want. If they were truly committed to a long term peace, they would have taken steps to disarm. So, as for what made them have this change of heart, it isn’t because they want peace, but because they are running out of resources, and they want to take some time to get back into the good graces of the public. Burns says, “It was perhaps an acknowledgment that the group had been badly weakened by a crackdown by Spanish and French security forces” (New York Times). This leads us to the next question, is this declaration a sign that peace really is increasing? In short, no. In addition to all of the reasons we discussed in class, the fact there is no long term solution put forth by the announcement makes it likely that violence will soon break out again.

Hopefully, the ETA will stick to their promise. If they do then the region will be a safer place, and peace really would have increased. If not, then nothing will have changed, and they would have proven that they are still unwilling to commit to peace. But, a few questions remain. What about other terrorist organizations? Will they ever make these same types of claims? What would it take to solidify this peace for years to come? Only time will tell, and the world will just have to wait and see what the future holds.

Works Cited

"BBC News - What Is Eta?" BBC - Homepage. British Broadcasting Corporation, 20 Oct. 2011. Web. 24 Oct. 2011. .

Burns, John F. "Basque Separatists Halt Campaign of Violence." Nytimes.com. The New York Times, 20 Oct. 2011. Web. 23 Oct. 2011. < http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/21/world/europe/eta-basque-separatists-declare-halt-to-violence-in-spain-and-france.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1/>.

"ETA." Encyclopædia Britannica. Encyclopædia Britannica Online Academic Edition. Encyclopædia Britannica,2011.Web.23Oct.2011. .

Gleave, Jonathan. "Spaniards Hopeful as ETA Ends Armed Struggle - News - Mail & Guardian Online." Mail & Guardian Online: The Smart News Source. 21 Oct. 2011. Web. 23 Oct. 2011. .

"Taiji...the little village with a big secret"

The fishermen in the small Japanese village of Taiji, every September to March, gather around a guarded cove that is used to lure in dolphins by the hundreds to slaughter every day. Graphic images of the fishermen’s tactics have since become brought to the public’s attention ever since the activism of eco-terrorist Ric O’Barry and eco-terrorist groups. Ric O’Barry, and various eco-terrorism organizations such the Sea Shepard Conservation Society, has brought to light the various failures and corruption of liberal organizations such as the International Whaling Commission-otherwise known as the IWC- and the fishermen that engage in the gross nature of dolphin fishing[i]. The means as to how these eco-terrorists were able to accomplish capturing footage of the heinous act of dolphin fishing often involved breaking a multitude of Taiji’s and Japan’s laws. By breaking these laws these eco-terrorists not only brought exigency to condemning Japan and the dolphin hunting fishermen, but also to the condemning the failures of some liberal institutions such as the IWC.

Liberal institutions such as the UN, NATO, and the EU act as international institutions that provide a community for sovereign states to interact with each other in a formal matter that enables international cooperation and collective security. However, liberal institutions do not always provide stories of success. In contrast, international organizations such as the International Whaling Commission (IWC) receive criticism for providing an international stage that provides no feasible resolutions that can help detour whaling and dolphin hunting. Dolphin hunting has especially caused a dissonance between the sovereign state of Japan and the members with who they are obligated in a social contract with, the people of Japan and the IWC. The failure of the IWC to regulate Japan’s fishing has only further enabled Japan to continue their practice; a practice that affects the people of Japan, the global ecosystem, and most importantly, to international relation scholars, the legitimacy of liberal institutions.

The IWC only has the ability to lawfully hold Japan accountable for the deaths of large cetaceans; however, no international organization holds the states that endanger small cetaceans such as dolphins[ii]. The IWC is only able to recommend certain procedures that many states like Japan blatantly ignore because of the profit they reap from dolphin hunting. Japan would still be able to get away with the killing of dolphins even if the IWC was able to pass legislation that banned it. This is because the IWC itself is a weak liberal institution that offers no incentives for members to play by the rules. Working liberal institutions are able to get work done by being able to hold troops, sanctions, and trade over members who purposefully do not follow regulations. The IWC does not have any troops, promises, threats, or substantial resources that would pin Japan down to abide by international law. Lastly, the IWC is a purely voluntarily organization; meaning states can opt out of a decision based on filing a notice within ninety days. These notices have been filed by states like Norway and Russia in order to maintain their activities of whale hunting in the early 1990s and 2000s for food purposes[iii]. The IWC, as a liberal institution, has proved itself to be an inefficient international organization that doesn’t effectively enact an overall policy that can be carried out.

This is where eco-terrorist organizations and activists such as Ric O’Barry and the Sea Shepard Conservation Society step in in order to try to regulate Japan’s dolphin hunting as civilians with the first amendment. As seen in the Micewski article, there are both programmatic rights and transcendental rights that states and non-state actors can violate[iv]. What is unusual about some eco-terrorists, such as Ric O’Barry, is that he does not violate the transcendental rights of citizens and civilians when trying to accomplish the goal of reforming the dolphin hunting industry in Japan. Instead, he has committed small crimes which have lead him to be arrested multiple times, for activities such as breaking and entering, freeing privately owned sea life, etc which have brought attention to his cause and enlightened the public about international whaling/dolphin fishing crimes[v].

As said in the Miceweksi article that was read this week, “…terrorists do not refrain from the most supreme sacrifices and cruelties, as they are well aware that the success of their intentions and beliefs is dependent on their impact on the public.[vi]” Eco-terrorist groups all over the world strive for media attention in order to not be belittled as simply ordinary tree-huggers. Time in jail and being blacklisted from the country of Japan were only some of the consequences that Ric O’Barry had to face in order to shed light on the startling information of the dolphin hunting that was happening in Taiji. Ric O’Barrys efforts are not exceptional though; many other eco-terrorists go to even further lengths in order to make sure that the media hears their message loud and clear. Organizations such as the Sea Shepard Conservation Society, lead by Paul Watson, have been known to sink and attack whaling ships[vii]. Ultimately, both forms of eco-terrorism, as recognized by the state of Japan, achieve possibly the most important goal of bringing media attention to the issue at hand.

It is interesting that two groups, non-state actors that act differently in the way they treat transcendental rights, have the same aims but use different means in order to get their message across. Those who impose on the transcendental rights of innocent civilians, such as the Sea Shepard Conservation Society, receive negative reputations as insane environmentalists who may receive media spotlight but do nothing to effectively further their cause in a way that is legal. However, activists like Ric O’Barry, who are willing to break laws that don’t infringe on transcendental rights, are more able to gather support for their cause. Although he may be a radical environmentalist he was able to condense his message in an award-winning documentary titled The Cove, which was able to carry the message of environmentalists to the general public in a sensible manner.

Why is it that many of these terrorist organizations, whether they are left-leaning or right-leaning, tend to undermine the importance of carrying out your message without resorting to imposing on the transcendental rights, such as the right to live. Media attention is important in furthering messages, however, violence and murder outside of war only gives others opportunity to classify the message as too radical. If terrorist organizations were able to refrain from violence and murder maybe their organizations and their respective messages would be seen as more legitimate to outside bodies such as sovereign state governments, liberal institutions, and the general public. So fellow world politic bloggers, the question that I wonder is whether there is effectiveness in simply breaking misdemeanors and committing smaller crimes like Ric O’Barry rather than grand schemes that may push your agenda worldwide such as Al-Qaeda’s or Hamas’. I suppose the answer is that there is no answer; that the answer depends upon the situation like many other International Relation phenomena’s, but maybe there are patterns that others see that I cant.

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[i] Mark, Jason. “Conversation: Ric O’Barry.” Earth Island Journal, Vol. 26, Issue 2. Academic Search Premiere. Web. Oct. 21, 2011.

[ii] Nishi, Yui. “Dolphins, Whales, and the Future of the International Whaling Commission.” Hastings International and Comparative law Review. Vol 33, Issue 1. PAIS International. Web. Oct. 21, 2011.

[iii] Blichfeldt, Georg. “The Controversial Beef: Norway Resumes Whaling.” Scandinavian Review, Vol. 80, Issue 2. Academic Search Premier. Web. Oct. 22. 2011.

[iv] Micewski article from in class

[v]http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/whales/interviews/obarry1.html

[vi] Micewski article from in class

[vii] Field, Michael. “Anti-Whaling Campaign Goes “Kamikaze”.” http://www.stuff.co.nz/environment/5723065/Anti-whaling-campaign-goes-kamikaze

Hezbollah and Hamas: Is A More Peaceful Future Possible?

Today, the world does not face the threat of major wars between superpowers, but is instead faced with the danger of attacks from non-state actors that use terror tactics in order to achieve their goals. It is often thought of as the weapon used by the weak, for they have no other way in which to achieve their goals. How effective is the use of terrorism in terms of reaching their major goals? In particular, how effective is it for Hezbollah and Hamas, two major organizations that make use of terror in the Middle East? Will their effectiveness ever change the way the go about accomplishing their goals?

The organizations that use terror as a tactic vary widely. They can be small, working only for changes in one country, or they can be international networks such as al-Qaeda, working throughout a large part of the world. They also hold many different motives, beliefs, and ideas, which often overlap each other. They can range from religious to political. Many believe that what makes terrorism so dangerous in today’s world is the use of weapons of mass destruction and the internet, which is an example of terrorism evolving with the rest of humanity.

Terrorism can cause a huge amount of damage – killing thousands of people and causing millions of dollars in losses, or it can be a small bomb that kills only a few people. However, the physical damages are always a lot less than the mental damage and fear that it breeds. But, even though it causes a large amount of fear, it is also the source of anger. After the attacks of September 11^th, President Bush declared a “war on terror,” and was fully supported by the American population. The United States, along with the rest of the world, has not even thought about giving in to the demands of organizations such as al-Qaeda.

In 1983, Hezbollah came to the world stage when they launched a series of terrorist attacks against American troops in Lebanon (Hezbollah). These attacks on American troops convinced the army to depart from the war-torn country. Hezbollah has since become a major threat in the region. It has gained seats in the Lebanese government, and is the main representation of the Shia population in Lebanon, providing the population with necessities that they would not be able to get otherwise (Hezbollah). Their assistance of the Shia population has gained them the support that they needed from the group, enabling them to become a major political party in the country. So, while they have yet to accomplish any of their more important, long-term goals, Hezbollah has accomplished many smaller goals that could eventually lead to their success.

Similarly, Hamas, a nationalistic and religious group in Palestine, has gained control of the Gaza Strip through an agreement with Fatah, who controls the West Bank. The main goal of the organization is to create a Palestinian state based on Islamic law (Hamas). Hamas, like Hezbollah, uses much of its resources in order to better the life of the people it governs. However, the presence and power that Hamas holds was the major reason that the United States vetoed the recent Palestinian bid for statehood in the United Nations. The United States will not support the birth of a nation when half of it is under control of an organization that routinely uses terror. The times may be changing for Hamas though. According to the Council on Foreign Relations, Palestinians in the Gaza Strip are beginning to feel the need for a regime change (Hamas). What this means for the future of Hamas and its tactics has yet to be seen.

Both of these organizations have many similarities. Both of them use terror tactics, but they also function as governmental parties. As a government party, they use a lot of their budgets to fund the people who support them. This support gives them security in return for support their regimes. There is a possibility that these two organizations could take the path of the Palestinian Liberation Organization, which used terror until it made peace with Israel in the 1993 Oslo Accords, which also established the Palestinian Authority, now the recognized governmental system of the West Bank (Terrorism Havens).

Is it possible that Hamas and Hezbollah will take the path of the Palestinian Liberation Organization? As they seek to become a legitimate power, they might find the need to use the terror tactic less and less. If they are ever going to see their goals accomplished, I think I might have to do just that. If it is possible, then the future of terrorism does not look so grim.

             

Works Cited

“Hamas”. Council on Foreign Relations. 20 October 2011. 20 October 2011.             http://www.cfr.org/israel/hamas/p8968

“Hezbollah (a.k.a. Hizbollah, Hizbu'llah)”. Council on Foreign Relations. 15 July 2010. 20                        October 2011. http://www.cfr.org/lebanon/hezbollah-k-hizbollah-hizbullah/p9155

“Terrorism Havens: Palestinian Authority”. Council on Foreign Relations. December 2005. 

        20 October 2011. http://www.cfr.org/palestinian-authority/terrorism-havens-palestinian-

        authority/p9515

Does Hamas Commit Acts of Terror or Does it Commit Acts of War?

            Hamas came into existence in late 1987 in response to the then decades long Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Palestinian members of the Muslim Brotherhood used the First Intifada (meaning uprising in Arabic, a popular revolt against Israel, which lasted from 1987-1993) as the perfect opportunity to establish their new movement. This new group was called “Hamas, or the Islamic Resistance Movement. Hamas's charter, released a year later, is studded with anti-Semitism and declares ‘jihad its path and death for the cause of Allah its most sublime belief.’” (WSJ) In 1991, Hamas, after having gained more and more popular support, established the “al-Qassam Brigades,” which legitimized Hamas in a way that broke it into two parts: the political wing, and the military wing, responsible for attacks against Israel. (USAToday) Hamas continues scattered suicide and other attacks on Israel over the next decade.

It is widely accepted that Hamas played a major role in instigating and fighting in the second Intifada as well. To Hamas’s pleasure, they also benefited more than anyone else from the Intifada. Hamas led an uprising that changed the dynamic in the region forever. Much more violent than the first Intifada, the second Intifada was responsible for the lives of 3,223 Palestinians and 950 Israelis, as well as 52 foreigners and it lasted about five years. (BBC) The overarching cause of the uprising was a general dissatisfaction with the results of the Oslo Accords. Palestinians were upset by the results of the talks and that disapproval collected upon, what had then become decades of unrest and unhappiness, eventually erupting into a mass riot against Israel.  In early 2004 Hamas leadership offered to end its participation in the Intifada in return for a Palestinian state in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem. Soon after that proposal was made Hamas issued a preemptive counter-offer for a decade-long truce in return for a phased liberation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The Israelis declined both offers, passing them off as fraudulent. (Independent) The two men who made the offers were soon thereafter killed in targeted Israeli airstrikes.

The following year, 2005, Hamas boycotted the Palestinian presidential election, but did take part in small, local elections organized by Yasser Arafat. Hamas overwhelmingly controlled the municipal elections, receiving control of more than a third of the districts, beating long time champions and political giant, Fatah. In the 2006 national elections they again beat Fatah, winning 76 of the 132 parliamentary seats in the Palestinian Authority, compared to Fatah’s 43 seats. (NYT) This overwhelming defeat was seen a cry for the end of Fatah’s rule, which was plagued with inaction and corruption. Hamas had brought down Fatah and the PLO, (as Fatah is the largest sector of the PLO) and ended their 40 years of political reign. Following the rise of Hamas and the downfall of Fatah, a large sector of the international community, namely, the US, Russia, the EU, and a majority of the UN, issued an ultimatum to the Hamas controlled Palestinian Authority, warning them that any support that they were being given would be cut off they did not renounce violence, recognize Israel’s right to exist, and adhere to previous agreements between the Palestinians and Israelis. Obviously, Hamas refused, and the ultimatum issuers followed through by stopping all international aid to the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

            The post-election unstable relations between Hamas and Fatah were destroyed in June 2007 when Hamas used the instability of the Palestinian Authority to kick out Fatah politicians from Gaza. In response, now President, Abbas dismissed all Fatah members of the Palestinian Authority and made Hamas militias illegal. Violent skirmishes between Fatah and Hamas left 600+ dead and Human Rights Watch was issuing accusations of torture and war crimes for both sides. (YNET and HRW) In the end, while disputes still continue, Hamas remains in control of Gaza while Fatah is in control of the West Bank.

            Egypt announced on June 17, 2008 that Hamas and Israel had reached a six-month truce where Hamas agreed to stop rocket fire into Israel and to commit to preventing other Palestinian groups from attacking Israel and Israel would allow for trade over the Gaza border.  This truce eventually failed however, but in July 2009, turning against their decades long mantras, Hamas stated that they were willing to cooperate in a resolution in the conflict, wherein there would be a Palestinian state whose borders were taken from the 1967 proposal, Palestinian refugees would be given the right to return home to Israel and, finally, East Jerusalem would be recognized as the state’s capital. (Reuters)

            The purpose of this length retelling of Hamas’s history is to illustrate what could only be called an evolution.  Hamas started as a group of Palestinians, whose ideology was adopted largely from the Muslim Brotherhood.  Over the last twenty years, Hamas has morphed into a governing body.  When foreign states are addressing the Palestinians in Gaza, they address Hamas.  When there are elections in Gaza, Hamas wins, and Hamas becomes the voice of the people.  When Israel has a military offensive or has peace talks it is against or with Hamas. The importance of this evolution is that the actions of Hamas ten or fifteen years ago, cannot be categorized the same way or even called by the same names.  Hamas’s terrorism of, say, 1990 may be today’s terroristic acts in the context of a war.

The definition of terrorism for the purpose of this paper, is the use of fear-inspiring tactics against non-military people or property (i.e. soft targets) as a means to achieve a desired political, social, economic, religious, or geographic (meaning a desired specific geographic area due to any of the previous reasons) goal, perpetrated by a non-state actor or a non-military. The definition of war, for the purpose of this paper, is the use of violence against military people or property (i.e. hard targets) as a means to achieve a desired political goal, perpetrated by a state actor or military. And, finally, the definition of a terroristic act in the context of a war, is a fear-inspiring tactic used against soft targets as a means toward winning a greater war, perpetrated by a state actor or military.

Hamas’s evolution shows that they cannot be simply identified as a terrorist organization, which commits terrorist acts.  They are the internal popularly recognized government.  By definition, a government cannot be a terrorist, or use terrorism, as they are a state actor.  Hamas is a state actor and military that has declared war, by war of acts of war, and in the context of that war, Hamas has committed acts of terror.  The same too could be argued against Israel for the dropping of white phosphorous and the burning of olive trees in Gaza.

Currently Hamas is recognized as a terrorist organization by nations like the U.S., E.U., Canada, Israel, and Japan but not by nations like Russia, India, and Turkey.  This is not to say that those countries that do not classify Hamas as a terrorist organization are correct, (those nations’ motivations for that decision are entirely different and hugely complex analysis), but rather that there exists a split.  The definition used so far for this analysis would suggest that it is inappropriate to classify Hamas as a terrorist organization, because, they simply are not.  Hamas is the government of Gaza, a democratically elected government that has chosen to informally declare war on Israel, and in the process of combatting that war, has used acts of terror as a tactic for winning that war.  What does seem more appropriate is for countries to have a separate list that identifies state actors, and governments as having used acts of terror as a tactic in warfare. 

It is a very fine line between terrorism and acts of terror committed by a government, under the blanket of warfare.  Hard questions need to be asked, like was the Taliban a legitimate state actor at the time of 9/11, at which point, 9/11 was not a act of terror, but rather an act of war, that was also a terroristic act, used as a tactic of warfare.  Also, it has to be decided whether these acts are war crimes, whether or not this particular analysis holds water. 

Terrorism and warfare are extremely difficult concepts to think about.  They truly have an endless number of facets that dictate how they are to be analyzed.  Belligerents have to be considered, as well as tactics, weapons, motivations, justness, human error, etc.  The world currently stands in a more or less binary state when it comes to violence on a mass scale: war or terror.  But the truth is, the two overlap and warring states can commit acts of terror and terrorists can commit acts of war.

Work Cited:

Higgins, Andrew. "How Israel Helped to Spawn Hamas." The Wall Street Journal. 24 Jan. 2009.<http://online.wsj.com/article/NA_WSJ_PUB:SB123275572295011847.html>.

"Main Events in Hamas' History." News, Travel, Weather, Entertainment, Sports, Technology, U.S. & World - USATODAY.com. The Associated Press, 22 Mar. 2004. <http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2004-03-22-hamas-timeline_x.htm>.

"BBC NEWS | Middle East | Intifada Toll 2000-2005." BBC News - Home. 8 Feb. 2005. Web. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3694350.stm>.

Huggler, Justin. "Israel Rejects 'insincere' Hamas Offer of 10-year Truce." The Independent. 27 Jan. 2004. <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/israel-rejects-insincere-hamas-offer-of-10year-truce-574542.html>.

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