A recent news article in the Economist depicted an attack in Egypt on the Israeli embassy by a large group of Egyptians, in which most of the Egyptian policemen and onlookers did not move to stop the violence. This type of aggression is fueled by an increasing anti-Israeli sentiment in Egypt. Although there is much tension between the two states, the Israel-Egypt relationship is oddly stagnant. Israel and Egypt continually build up security measures and act in ways to display their respective authority, but according to a poll, the overarching public opinion is that neither state wants to go to war with the other (Washington Post). So, the states remain in limbo—building intimidation, but not acting. Parallel to realist theorists, I would argue that this competition will yield such instability that Israel and Egypt will inevitably end up at war, and the bi-polarity between Israel and the U.S. has the potential to expedite the start of such a war.
Although the U.S. claims that it is always in support of democracy, the revolution in Egypt this past spring caused Israel’s ally to have a new outlook on democracy in the Arab world. The rise of a democracy in Egypt could allow anti-American and anti-Israeli Arabs to take a spot in the front seat of the government, as some argue that only Mubarack’s “inner circle” was in favor of positive foreign relations with these two states. For instance, in February of this past year, a group of Egyptians cut a pipeline to Israel, stopping the flow of gas from Egypt into Israel (“Egypt-U.S. Relations”). This attack was not ordered by Mubarack, rather it was an anti-Israeli offensive staged by Egyptian citizens (citizens that could be part of the government in Egypt’s new democracy). The aforementioned situation seems to only have occurred due to anti-Israeli feeling. However, the bi-polarity of Israel and the U.S. helps to fuel the hostile attitude in the Egypt.
Before delving into the issue of bi-polarity, it is important to note that the alliance between the U.S. and Israel is beneficial on many levels. The alliance protects the Israeli state and gives the U.S. more power in this region of the world. Yet, as Israel’s next-door neighbor, the Egyptians may feel threatened by the multilayered defense and offense of the Israel-U.S. alliance, and therefore increase their own arms and security measures tenfold.
Furthermore, in some ways, the U.S. and Israel act as bi-hegemonic powers, and Egypt is left inferior. Under Mubarack, this system as well as the treaty of 1979 (which made Egypt the first Arab state to officially recognize Israel), caused relations between Israel and Egypt to be relatively calm; so much that “Israel had reduced its defense expenditure from 23 percent of its gross national product in the mid-1970s to about 9 percent today” (“Egypt-U.S. Relations”). Yet, the Arabs never felt at ease with this system, as it allowed Israel to be the dominant state in the region. The rise of democracy in Egypt has yielded an unusual amount of uncertainty because, for the first time since 1979, the peace treaty has been threatened. Arabs can equalize the playing field via their new democracy. Through a realist perspective, this uncertainty could make for a dangerous cycle: Growing anti-American and anti-Israeli feeling in Egypt stimulates Israel to build up security and arms, and the U.S. to assert their dominance, Egypt’s discontent grows, Egypt strengthens their offense and defense, and thus the cycle continues. Evidently, in this case, polarity is not a solution to the problem. The bi-polarity of the U.S. and Israel could increase tensions and make the situation even worse—causing a war that no one actually wants.
Unfortunately, the U.S. usually falls on “democracy” for the answer to all of its questions. This case is not so simple. Democracy could lend power to the Muslim Brotherhood, a group of Islamists that do not see eye-to-eye with the treaty of 1979. If the Muslim Brotherhood were to become a major part of the Egyptian government, Israel would be greatly endangered. An additional fear of Egyptian democracy is that an independent Egypt could become similar to the Israel-Turkey situation. In May 2010, the Israel-Turkey alliance was broken, and this wrecked peace has allowed for violent outbreaks (Blanche). Just recently, Turkey threw an Israeli diplomat out of the country, and this act was actually the stimulus for the Egyptian attack on the Israeli embassy (“Feeling the Heat of Isolation”). Fears of an anti-American, anti-Israeli government as Egypt moves toward democracy is causing the already minimal trust between the three nations to decline, and once again, instability takes reign, and war is on the horizon.
In order for the potential crisis of war to be inhibited, but also for democracy to succeed, Egypt, Israel, and the U.S. must take the time to think about what exactly it is that they want: “If not war, then what?” Simply stated, if Israelis want to remain safe and powerful, while Egyptians want to stop feeling bullied, the best solution would be for Israel (with the help of the U.S.) to stop “dominating the region by force of arms,” as “Israel's doctrine since the creation of the state is less and less of a viable option.” In correspondence with the previously described cycle, Israel’s security measures “only… arouse ferocious and growing resistance, which must eventually erupt into violence” (Seale). What Israel and the U.S. need to do is rethink the manner in which their alliance asserts power in the region. In this situation, the best-case scenario would be for Israel, with the support of the U.S., to take on the idea that “only peace, not arms, can guarantee Israel’s long term security” (Seale). Contradictory to skeptical realist thought, this innovative mantra could cut the arms-security cycle, and bring stability to Israeli-Egyptian interactions.
Resources:
BLANCHE, ED. "For Israel, a nightmare scenario." Middle East 421 (2011): 22-23.
Academic Search Premier. EBSCO. Web. 20 Sept. 2011.
"Feeling the Heat of Isolation." The Economist. The Economist Online, 17 Sept. 2011.
Web. 20 Sept. 2011.
Seale, Patrick. "The Future of the Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty." Washington Report on
Middle East Affairs 30.3 (2011): 14-15. Academic Search Premier. EBSCO. Web.
20 Sept. 2011.
"U.S.-EGYPT RELATIONS." International Debates 9.3 (2011): 14-23. Academic
Search Premier. EBSCO. Web. 20 Sept. 2011.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2011/02/04/AR2011020402774.html
One could also make the case that the Egyptians are focusing their rage and anger on Israel in order to avoid growing outrage at home. Egypt currently in an economic recession and facing both rising inflation and the lost of tourism revenue due to the uprising. The average Egyptian income is 6,200 dollars and while food staples such as bread are heavily subsidized; food prices are still rapidly rising.
ReplyDeleteFollowing the overthrow of Mubarak, public outrage at the government continues to grow. Some of this outrage has turn towards Israel as seen by the attack on the Israeli embassy; and some Egyptians put the blame on Israel for the state of their country. The Egyptian government was slow to respond to the attack on the embassy, letting it be partially destroyed before publicly coming out and saying they "would reprimand those involved".
If one were to stand out on a limb, one could say that the Egyptian government is secretly pushing the public to lash its anger out at the Israelis. As it would focus less attention on them, and rally nationalist's spirits on a common enemy( such as the case in Britain during the Falklands Wars one could argue).
If this seems eerily similar to another case in history, it could be said the same pattern is happening. (Pshhhhh....I'm talking about Hitler's rise to power)
While I am not saying that the Egyptian government will become another Nazi Germany. IR scholars must keep in mind that when it comes to war, there is more than meets the eye.
I have to agree a bit with Tony. Although both nations have recognized that they still want to follow the Camp David Accords, it seems to me that the Egyptian government and police force are trying to force the attention from themselves on to the Israelis. With Egyptian support of the Camp David Accords at an all time low it is not surprising that the Egyptian government and police force capitalize on it after the fall of Mubarak in order to retain or gain popularity.
ReplyDeleteIt leads me to think if this is an issue of change or continuity as we have examined before in class. The fact is, all these Israeli-Egyptian problems happened after Mubarak was ousted, a vocal defender and activist of the Camp David Accords. Without Mubarak there is no voice saying to the Egyptian people that they should remain friendly with their Israeli neighbors. This change in leadership after the uprising shifted the current state of politics that the two countries are going through now.
Will it escalate to war? I dont think so, not at this point anyway. Could Israel take on both a Palestinian and Egyptian conflict at this time? It is not in Israels best interests to be at war with their neighboring country of Egypt, it would only isolate them further from the Middle Eastern Arab world. Secondly, Egypt needs to realize that they need to work internally on their government before they can start focusing on external problems. They fought for a revolution and if they allow for the government to manipulate them by nationalism then they will find themselves in the same positions they were a year ago.
Ryan and Tony, both of you make convincing arguments, and I think altogether our points support realist theory. Perhaps Egypt is focusing their angst on Israel right now just to shove the attention off of their own domestic turmoil. Despite this reasoning behind Egypt’s actions, the actions themselves remain violent and threatening. Egypt may just be rallying citizens’ support in the form of pseudo-anti-Israeli hoopla, but nonetheless, these actions impose upon Israeli safety and security. In response to Egypt’s nationalistic movements, it is in Israel’s best interest to be defensive. I agree with you, Ryan, it would not be logical for Israel (or Egypt) to go to war, but Israel must always focus on security, especially in its increasingly isolated state. Unfortunately, in accordance with realism, my goal is to point out that these defensive measures may provoke Egypt to act out even more, supporting the ever-growing instability between the two nations.
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