If conflict is what you want, look no further then Africa. East Africa, which includes countries like Ethiopia, Somali and Kenya, is plagued with the world’s worst food crisis. The Middle East and North Africa is booming with political unrest. Nigeria is an environmentalists’ worst nightmare, gaining the attention of human rights activists and fair trade advocates around the world due to its oil corporations. And countries like Rwanda and Darfur are breading grounds for Civil War and unrest (Shah). The Responsibility to Protect, or R2P, “is a recently developed concept in international relations regarding a state's responsibilities towards its population, as well as the international community's responsibility should a state fail or refuse to uphold its basic duties. One important aim, among others, is to provide a more focused legal and ethical framework for "humanitarian intervention": the intervention by external actors (preferably through international consensus and the approval of the UN Security Council) in a state that is unwilling or unable to prevent or stop genocide, massive killings and other massive human rights violations” (“Responsibility to Protect”).
The idea of R2P seriously challenges the dominance of state sovereignty as a guide for international law because that sovereignty is no longer only a privilege, but also a responsibility. Concerning the stability of the international system, is it better for state sovereignty to remain sacred or for the international community to adopt the doctrine of R2P?
The Chinese proverb “Give a man a fish and you feed him for a day. Teach a man to fish and you feed him for a lifetime,” applies almost perfectly to the idea of Responsibility to Protect, or R2P. In a perfect world, R2P would be a process where one country, or a collection of countries, can help another by teaching it how to fish. However, this is not a perfect world, and instead of teaching countries how to fish, R2P has been a process where fish are handed out, often with interest attached.
Before R2P, the world would watch as countries like Rwanda and Bosnia had their people slaughtered, having to then deal with the guilt, silently witnessing genocide. Nevertheless, what one must first consider is the obligation of a country in regards to another. As human beings, we are only responsible for ourselves, evident in the Hobbsean state of nature, where life is “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short,” due to mans need to protect himself. Of course, one can assume that even in our most natural form, as human beings we possess morals. Still, these morals are personal, and only once man is thrust into government do these morals become a public agreement of sorts – a shared ideal and belief. That is why guilt is evoked when one watches a child get bullied by another, and does nothing. Nonetheless, in our most pure state of nature, we would watch such an act, and be thankful we were still in one piece.
Darfur is a perfect example of the failure of R2P. “Darfur is a typical North-East African civil war, consisting of multiple overlapping conflicts interspersed with large-scale of ensives by the government army and its proxies and rebels. During 2001–2003, local disputes were exacerbated by the breakdown of local governance and combined with the ambitions of a frustrated provincial elite to fuel an insurgency, which escalated more quickly and bloodily than either side anticipated. The government response was both ham-fisted and ruthless—characteristics of Khartoum’s counter-insurgencies since the 1980s. The result was massacre, displacement and famine, an overall death toll probably exceeding 200,000, the deepening of distrust between Darfurians and the political leaders in Khartoum to the point of bitter hatred, and the fragmentation of Darfurian society into a state approaching anarchy, characterized by multiple local conflicts” (De Waal).
National organizations were created in order to help bring stability and peace to the conflict; however, none were able to achieve their goals. The Ndjamena Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement, signed on April 8th 2004, was “the basis for all subsequent diplomatic efforts on Darfur,” yet the agreement was rushed. The AU, or African Union, was allowed to provide protection for civilians, but did not have the supplies to achieve it. And lastly AMIS (African Mission in Sudan) attempted to bring stability to the situation, but lacked the funds and resources to do so. The responses of the UN Security Council and the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) consisted chiefly of ad hoc steps rather than a systematic or strategic approach to the crisis” (De Waal).
The UNSC implemented a disarmament resolution in July 2004, however did nothing to monitor or even implement the resolution, and failed to act when said resolution was broken. “In August the UN demanded a series of steps to ensure security around displaced persons’ camps but also failed to take any follow-up actions when Sudan government actions stalled. Later the UNSC adopted a resolution enabling it to identify individuals obstructing the peace process and sanction them, but it has used this instrument only slowly, sparingly and ineffectively” (De Waal).
“Over the period 2004–2007, the international community pursued a range of objectives for Darfur that included improving security and humanitarian access, supporting the CPA, obtaining justice at The Hague, seeking a negotiated peace, dispatching a UN force and punishing those standing in the way of these goals. The multiplicity of these goals impeded a clear and coherent strategy. Some actions demanded the impossible while others set unrealistic deadlines. Few were followed up on” (De Waal).
Now that R2P is being enforced and used in international politics (albeit ineffectively), another more current example we faced was the No-Fly Zone in Libya. Firstly, why was Libya chosen, and not, for example, Bahrain? According to the United States Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, each case has its own merits and should be taken as a stand-alone. However, one can see interest play a large role in such decision-making. Libya is not a large-scale producer of oil, meaning the US has noting to loose with reaching a disagreement with Libya (economically). Secondly, one must take into account how much the ‘weak kid’ wants help to stop the ‘bully.’ The No-Fly zone will not be causality free, and means that bombing Libyan air forces is a necessity. This can be seen as Western interference, and can even anger the very people the US wishes to help. Also, tying into national interest, and raison d’état, continuing with the No-Fly zone in Libya would require the taking away of much needed resources in Afghanistan.
So what should be done? When thinking back to the state of nature, if Obama, for example, cannot live with the guilt of not helping a country or its people, he can march on over there and make his difference. However, at this point, it seems unfair to both the population helping, as to the population receiving the help, to accept it. The road to hell is paved with good intentions, and although a country may seem to be helping another, everyone acts in their own interest, and politicians want to get re-elected or gain popularity.
The concept of R2P is a nice one – optimistic, inspiring and hopeful. However, our world makes it hard tell what help is necessary, and what help is for the sole purpose of flashing for money. Until our intentions become as close to pure as possible, attempting to defend others will backfire terribly.
Works Cited:
De Waal, Alex. "Darfur [Sudan] And The Failure Of The Responsibility To Protect." International Affairs 83.6 (2007): 1039-1054. International Political Science Abstracts. Web. 8 Nov. 2011.
"Responsibility to Protect." Dictionary Sensagent. Sensagent, Jan. 2009. Web. 7 Nov. 2011. <http://dictionary.sensagent.com/responsibility+to+protect/en-en/>.
Shah, Anup. "Conflicts in Africa — Global Issues." Global Issues: Social, Political, Economic and Environmental Issues That Affect Us All — Global Issues. 31 July 2011. Web. 08 Nov. 2011. <http://www.globalissues.org/issue/83/conflicts-in-africa>.
Julia,
ReplyDeleteI think one of the main issues with the failures of R2P that you have mentioned above is that it does not come from within the country. On Monday, we discussed whether it is better for the incentive for development to come from the state itself or to come from outside actors. This is a difficult choice to make because success and failure is so subjective and varies from region to region throughout the world.
However, in the case of R2P in East Africa, I think one of the causes of failure is that R2P consists of a set of normative values: "to prevent and halt genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and mobilize" (http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/about-coalition). Because these "norms" are based upon morals and less so upon concrete fact and law, countries are less likely to abide by these rules because their values obviously conflict.
Thus, the question remains- because genocide and such crimes are so engrained in morals and values, how can they be stopped? It is difficult for outside actors to go into a country trying to change morality without stirring even more conflict. This is a constructivist dilemma that I think will remain a puzzle for too long of a time.
I agree with Hannah's statement to an extent, one of the problems with R2P is that it does not come from within the country. But within regions like these where they are not able to support themselves how can we expect aid to come from within the country? It almost seems as if outside help is the only option in some cases. Only so much can be done within the state itself without outside aid.
ReplyDeleteHannah & Rachael,
ReplyDeleteI agree with you both. Hannah is right in that inflicting moralistic values withint a country as an outside force is both difficult and intangible. On the other hand, Rachael is right that we cannot expect a country to provide aid for itself if it cannot even support itself.
Thus I propose that outside forces should not focus on "ending" genocide per say through a more moralistic lens, but instead should focus on taking out the corrupt and weak leaders in these states that are not abiding by general human rights laws (and usually, laws withint the state itself). They then have legitimacy to provide aid and take them out of power, and this would help losen the strong hold these leaders tend to have on their people. Also, if the leadership is taken away from an outside force, then the state ITSELF can focus on building a better and new state, with their own morals and laws, which could possibly avoid more conflict.
Hey Julia,
ReplyDeleteI have a question about your proposal to take out leaders in countries of conflict. Does the R2P currently have the power to do so? One of the pillars of the ICR2P is to first use peaceful means, and then move to more forceful tactics to establish peace. Does this force involve taking out leaders, or does it only apply to people directly involved in the violence?
Hey Emma,
ReplyDeleteI did some research, and according to the ICRtoP site:
"The Coalition commits to support the essential elements of the Responsibility to Protect norm agreed to in Paragraphs 138-139 of the 2005 UN World Summit Outcome Document.
1. States have the primary obligation to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing. This responsibility also includes prevention of these crimes, including incitement.
2. The international community should, as appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise this responsibility.
3. The international community should support the UN in establishing an early warning capability.
4. The international community also has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means under Chapter VI and VIII of the UN Charter to help protect populations threatened by these crimes.
5. When a state “manifestly fails” in its protection responsibilities, and peaceful means are inadequate, the international community must take stronger measures including Chapter VII measures under the UN Charter, including but not limited to the collective use of force authorized by the Security Council.
6. In addition, defend against RtoP being interpreted as a new version of military humanitarian intervention.
7. Guard against the abuse of the norm by governments, regional organizations or international organizations.
So I guess in essence there is no rule that allows them TO take a leader out of power, however, according to elements 4 & 5, it seems as if the ICRtoP could be granted the authority to do so.
Here's an interesting debate on whether Libya was a success or failure for the R2P model:
ReplyDeletehttp://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/16/opinion/the-lesson-of-libya.html?_r=2&src=tp
Does all countries have equal responsibility and who they have to protect. There is a video that can be interesting!
ReplyDeletehttp://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HFmyJp_r9Fk