North Korean Trafficking

Hope you guys don't mind me taking it back a little.

In the past few decades, few countries have proved to be as much of an anomaly in international affairs than North Korea. Kim Jong-Il, North Korea’s eccentric Supreme Leader, has fundamentally opposed Western powers, especially the United States, since rising to his current position in 1994. While the norms of international relations have not shifted too dramatically since Kim Jong-Il assumed power of North Korea, the country has become difficult to gauge in terms of state relationships, motivations, and even intentions. Particularly since the 1990’s, North Korea has demonstrated unusual state actions by actively organizing and encouraging illegal trafficking of weapons, drugs, and material used in the creation of weapons-grade nuclear material (Chestnut, 83.)

As Hannah very effectively pointed out in her blog post, the risks of dangerous and illegal transnational trade are severe. Biological and nuclear weapon exchanges would be catastrophic in any context if they were successfully trafficked to the right hands. The United Nations and the United States have been plagued with how to appropriately handle North Korea’s willingness to produce and distribute weapons, drugs, cigarettes, and even counterfeit money called the Supernote. The economic sanctions placed on North Korea, deepening the country’s economic woes, have only made the North Korean government more willing to traffic in order to raise much needed funds (Chestnut 81). This point was blatantly iterated by North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye-Gwan’s statement that North Korea possesses the capability to distribute fissile material to terrorists and may consider it if “the US drives us into a corner. (Bullock).

In the case of North Korea, it is both fascinating and unnerving to examine the various stances North Korea could be secretly considering. Many argue that North Korea is in every way willing to sell either nuclear weaponry or nuclear technology to its sympathizers, whether they are states or non-state actors (Laurence). It seems, however, that the threat analysis is structured in a systematic way. From my analysis, it appears that fears of nuclear or chemical proliferation are based upon North Korea’s demonstrated willingness to participate in the illegal trade of previously mentioned items, including weapons, drugs, cigarettes, and counterfeit currency.

It may be that a combination of the various international theories may be able to explain North Korea’s seemingly irrational behavior, which would ironically establish the country as being purposefully irrational. Beginning with North Korea’s greatest power, nuclear weaponry and technology has been the largest attracter of attention for the country. A 2010 U.N. report suggested that North Korea may have already established nuclear technology trading programs with Syria, Iran, and Myanmar (Lawrence). Indeed, there exists speculation that the North Korean government supplied the Syrian nuclear reactor that many believe was destroyed by Israeli forces in 2007 (Soloman). While fears of nuclear proliferation by North Korea persist, there is no solid evidence has supplied the mechanisms to enable any states to procure nuclear weapons. Looking at this from a realist point of view, North Korea is highly unlikely to openly utilize nuclear weapons against any of its enemies for the same reason that any other country would be unlikely to, North Korea strives to survive. It is the same principle that drives North Korea to participate in the illegal smuggling of traditional weapons, drugs, and counterfeit currency.

North Korea’s stockpile of chemical and biological weapons can also be considered in a similar fashion as its nuclear ambitions. Some estimates place North Korea’s stockpile at anywhere from 2,500 to 5,000 tons of toxic weaponry (Kaneda et al). While the smuggling of chemical and biological weapons by North Korea should be considered plausible, it is not truly expected that the country will use said weapons because that would attract the same type of retaliation that the use of nuclear weapons would. If North Korea is to gain benefit from possessing these weapons, it will be in its willingness and threats to sell them, rather than in any shallow threats to actively use them against any of its enemies.

Finally, there is the case of the much less dramatic, but still damaging, North Korean participation in the smuggling of certain materials. As already mentioned, North Korea is very much willing to traffic these materials in order to earn enough income to support its unusually large military, very much at the expense of its civilian population. The question here is why North Korea prevents its population from driving the growth of the country and economy and thus relies on illegal methods to only support a seemingly irrational military. The answers to this question show that North Korea may not be irrational at all in its methods. Firstly, as Sheena Chestnut points out, North Korea will have done a good job hiding its involvement in illegal trafficking, although the issue can be seen publicly by the slip-ups of certain government officials. For that reason, it is difficult for any one entity to accuse North Korea of trafficking dangerous materials. Such is that reason that it can’t be said with absolute certainty that North Korea supplied the nuclear reactor to Syria or that Israel was the country to destroy it. Also, the trafficking of traditional weapons, counterfeit currency, and cigarettes are but a thorn in a country like the United State’s side. It’s annoying, but doesn’t necessarily warrant full-scale surgery.

Unless the regime falls, it is likely that government sponsored trafficking will persist, albeit under intense cover. However, the most potential for negative events concerns the trafficking of nuclear, chemical, or biological materials. Considering North Korea’s preference for trafficking, it is unlikely that the government will really ever use those weapons against another. However, it appears as if North Korea is much less mindful of how such materials are used once they are sold to countries such as Syria, Iran, or Myanmar. Herein lays the source of the global predicament with North Korea and the source of much of the difficult that complicates any country’s attempt to “bully” North Korea into changing.

Finally, this backward logic enables us to guess the fundamental reason as to why North Korea seeks weapons, not to attack, but to sell. The answer contains both constructivist arguments and realist ideas, but, I believe, may explain some of North Korea’s actions. As Hobbes argues, and as is apparent in most every country, North Korea’s most fundamental goal is to survive. Its next priority is to abide by the rigid regime’s ideology-driven identity. This would explain why North Korea suppresses its population and forces itself into a dire situation of poverty that results in the international trafficking of illegal materials to fund its massive army. In other words, North Korea’s love of realist principles is so strong that it becomes an identity by which the rules of its actions are dictated.

This conclusion is troubling, because it suggests that the government of North Korea is unlikely to be persuaded into changing its beliefs and actions. As I mentioned, it is possible that one of the only ways the situation may be resolved is by the toppling of the regime that drives such intense ideology. While I barely scratched the surface of North Korea’s actions and possible thought processes, it is apparent that the country’s stance on trafficking is as good of a way of understanding the country’s broader intentions as any other.

Sources Cited:

Bullock, Todd. "Department of State Washington File: United States Urges North Korea To Return to Six-Party Talks." Department of State, 05 May 2005. Web. 15 Nov. 2011. .

Chestnut, Sheena. “Illicit Activity and Proliferation: North Korean Smuggling Networks”. International Security , Vol. 32, No. 1 (Summer, 2007), pp. 80-111. MIT Press. http://www.jstor.org.proxyau.wrlc.org/stable/30129802

Kaneda, Hikeaki. Kobayashi, Kazumasa. Tajima, Hiroshi. Tosaki, Hirofumi. “The Japanese Institute for International Affairs+. Japan’s Missile Defense: Diplomatic and Security Policies in a Changing Strategic Environment.” March 2007. p. 36. http://www2.jiia.or.jp/en/pdf/polcy_report/pr200703-jmd.pdf.

Laurence, Jeremy. “Q+A: Is North Korea’s Nuclear Program a Threat?” Reuters. January 31, 2010. http:// www.reuters.com/article/2011/01/31/us-korea-north-nuclear-idUSTRE70U1O420110131.

Solomon, Jay. “U.S. Sees Great North Korea Nuclear Threat.” The Wall Street Journal. December 3, 2010. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704377004575650960600657360.html.