The Motivation Behind the Attack

Ryan Stanley

Professor Craig

World Politics

16 October 2011

The Motivation Behind the Attack

“When you see how the President makes political or policy decisions, you see who he is. The essence of the Presidency is decision-making.”

– Bob Woodward, The Washington Post Reporter

Historians still debate to this day whether the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were the right things to do in 1945. Was it justified and the right thing to do in this war? What exactly was Truman thinking? Was he actually taking the advice of his military advisers? And what exactly were they telling him? It is a foggy topic and not even historians can put the pieces together as a result of there being so little evidence, so little documentation about the thinking and motivation behind the bombing.

On August 6, 1945 and August 9, 1945, two days that will live in infamy, the only atomic bombs ever used in a war were used against Japan by the U.S.A. This was the result of many culminating events, but came after “warnings” that were issued by the Allies in World War II. These countries met and issued the Potsdam Declaration. It reads, in part:

"We – the President of the United States, the President of the National Government of the Republic of China, and the Prime Minister of Great Britain, representing the hundreds of millions of our countrymen, have conferred and agree that Japan shall be given an opportunity to end this war...We call upon the government of Japan to proclaim now the unconditional surrender of all Japanese armed forces, and to provide proper and adequate assurances of their good faith in such action. The alternative for Japan is prompt and utter destruction" (Budge).

The presidents, prime ministers, and heads of state now cannot say Japan was not given a chance – maybe not a fair chance, but one at that. The bombs were dropped, without warning, killing over 150,000 people in Hiroshima and over 75,000 in Nagasaki; and according to the UCLA those numbers are over-conservative (Yamazaki). From a humanitarian perspective, this is very tragic. Many have wondered if every step possible was taken to ensure Japan's surrender before the bombs were used to kill so many human beings. I write this brief to examine a key issue in this war: The Soviet Union. Also, to relate it back to what has been discussed in class in regard to decision making and how states act to make decisions that are in their best interest.

Until the Soviet Union had actually invaded Japan, the country had hoped that they would end up intervening on Japan's behalf. However, agreements had already been made with America by The Soviet Union in regard to how the victory would be divided between the two. It was known to many that Russia wanted to expand into that part of Asia, and Japan was a very great opportunity and place to do so. Joseph Stalin was quoted as saying that for Russia's help in making Japan surrender, “Russia will share in the actual occupation of Japan” (Frank 217). It seemed as though the United States had Russia on board for this agreement. One would assume that the United States obtained a “big head” and an ego-flair when the atomic bomb idea came to light. James Byrnes was the Secretary of State at the time and writes, “As for myself, I must frankly admit that... I would have been satisfied had the Russians determined not to enter the war” (Alperovitz 274). This says that the United States didn't want The Soviet Union after all. Many government officials agreed that once Russia was in the war Japan would slowly become under their control.

James Byrnes was interviewed in 1960 by U.S. News and World Report. He was asked if there was a feeling of urgency to end the war in Japan before the Russians became too deeply involved. His response:

“There certainly was on my part, and I'm sure that, whatever views President Truman may have had of it earlier in the year, that in the days immediately preceding the dropping of the bomb his views were the same as mine – we wanted to get through the Japanese phase of the war before the Russians came in (Alperovitz 274).

In my opinion this says that President Truman wanted to end the war with The Soviet Union out of the picture. Alperovitz also writes that China was asked to withhold from certain interactions with Russia: “Mr. Byrnes told me this morning that he had cabled to T.V. Soong advising him not to give way on any point to the Russians...it is quite clear that the United States do not at the present time desire Russian participation in the war against Japan” (Alperovitz 270-1).

Through all of this, a very realist decision-making point-of-view is seen. The United States was looking out for its own interests and trying to obtain control and power in that area. In the beginning we see a cooperation with Russia, and then something happened and Russia was pushed off the table. The United States played power-politics and made the bombing decision by prioritizing national interest and security over ideology, moral concerns, and social reconstructions – just as realism does.

Works Cited

Alperovitz, Gar. The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb. Random House, New York, 1995.

Budge, Kent. "Potsdam Declaration." The Pacific War Online Encyclopedia. Pacific War Online Encyclopedia. Web. 16 Oct. 2011.

Frank, Richard B. Downfall: the End of the Imperial Japanese Empire. Random House, New York, 1999.

Yamazaki, James Dr. "Hiroshima and Nagasaki Death Toll." UCLA Asian American Studies Center: Welcome. University of California Los Angeles, 10 Apr. 2010.