It is no secret that a wedge has been forced into the relationship between the United States and Pakistan. The issue has attracted massive amounts of media attention in recent years because of the importance of Pakistani influence and cooperation in the War on Terror. The consequences of failed relationships between the US and Pakistan are immense; not limited to failure of the war by the US and billions of dollars less in aid for Pakistan. Considering the causes and consequences of several aspects of US-Pakistan relations, it is possible to identify Putnam’s two-level games and the intersection of various layers of win-sets that join to demonstrate the resulting relationship (Putnam, 10).
The first step in understanding why US-Pakistan relations are teetering on the edge of failed is to examine what pressures the United States experiences that are often the reasons for its decisions regarding Pakistan. One of the largest factors playing on the US is its public pressuring the government to withdraw troops from Afghanistan. In a January 2011 questionnaire, Gallup Poll reported that 71.24 % of Americans either strongly favored, or favored US troop withdrawal from Afghanistan (Gallup). This data is significant because Pakistan is often considered a “frontline” state in the War on Terror, meaning that many Al-Qaida and Taliban insurgents reside and operate from within Pakistan’s borders (Umbreen, 1). In order for the US to successfully carry out its goals, it must have the ability to locate and confront the insurgents within Pakistan. Therefore, in order for the US to complete its goals and withdraw from the Middle East, it must have Pakistani cooperation. Within this concept, there resides a complex win-set. The US public harbors a very intense desire for US troop operations in the War on Terror to be scaled down, which many be extremely difficult if the US is not allowed to operate within Pakistan. On a related level, both the US government and the public maintain a fundamental effort toward security. In the War on Terror, security can be reached by eliminating, or severely disabling, the ability of terrorist organizations to successfully accomplish their goals. On a much more subjective level, it is the goal of the current US administration to remain in power. Therefore, they are pressured by public opinion to at decisively in order to make progress toward an endpoint in the War on Terror.
On the flipside, Pakistan is facing even greater pressures from multiple facets. One of the largest discrepancies within Pakistan is the disconnect in authority between the Pakistan Army and the government (Fair, 103). The Pakistan Military is often viewed as being a separate authority than the actual government, which means that the military often makes choices that aren’t favored by the Pakistan government or the United States. Since the beginning of the war in 2001 to just 2009, the Pakistan Military refused to address insurgents in its North-West territory. In 2009, Pakistani public opinion finally turned to favor combat with extremist insurgents (Fair, 103). So, up until that point, resentful feelings between the United States and Pakistan were normal. Secondly, Pakistan’s relationship with the United States is often influenced by public opinion of the US. In June of 2011, 75% of the Pakistani public viewed the US unfavorably (Pew). This sort of reaction to the US severely affects the Pakistan government’s ability to cooperate with the US and to attempt to convince the military to be of a similar opinion as itself. Lastly, it is widely known that Pakistan is largely reliant on US foreign aid. Because of this, several instances have arisen that have further complicated US-Pakistan relations. One such example, and a very recent one, is the US accusation that Pakistan is playing a “double-game”, meaning that Pakistan is secretly trying to foster relations with the Pakistan Taliban because it had refused to confront the largest extremist threat within Pakistan, the Haqqani network (Miklaszewski). Of course, the Pakistan government rejects these claims and even stated that the US will “lose an ally” if such claims keep being made. In another aspect of foreign aid and its uses, international scholars recognize that in order for Pakistan to remain a key player in the Middle East, it needs to address certain aspects of its domestic and international issues that were present since before the War on Terror, such as its hostile relationship with India. “The US should understand that Pakistan’s competition for influence in the region and its domestic political interests outweigh the country’s interest in the US led ‘war on terrorism’ (Javaid, 130).
While this is an analysis of only a few select pressures on both the US and Pakistan, there a myriad of pressures arising from the public to influence how the United States and Pakistan interact with each other, especially where it concerns the War on Terror and Islamic insurgents within Pakistan’s borders. In regards to the terminology used by Putnam, these powerful and overlapping public influences and demands create win-sets that dictate how far US-Pakistan negotiations can progress without failing. While the US and Pakistan consistently promise cooperation with each other, it has and will become extensively more difficult to negotiate due to stronger and stronger opposition of the war in the Middle East by the US public. Also, as noted in the Javaid piece, if the US mission is to be successful, the US must recognize the distinct, and very different, goals and interests of Pakistan, which have to do more with domestic growth and relations with India. This all goes to say that the complex dance of US and Pakistan relations could not be analyzed without taking into consideration the pressures felt by the two countries from within their borders.
Sources Cited
“Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games.” Robert D. Putnam. International Organization. Vol. 42, No. 3 (Summer, 1988), pp. 427-460 Published by: The MIT Press Article Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706785
Javaid, Umbreen. "War on Terror: Pakistan's Apprehensions." African Journal of Political Science and International Relations. Political Science Department, University of the Punjab, Lahore, Mar. 2011. Web. 14 Oct. 2011.
Miklaszewski, Jim, and Anna Nawaz. "Pakistan Warns US: 'You Will Lose an Ally' - World News - South and Central Asia - Pakistan - Msnbc.com." Msnbc.com - Breaking News, Science and Tech News, World News, US News, Local News- Msnbc.com. NBC News, 23 Sept. 2011. Web. 14 Oct. 2011.
Pakistan in 2010. C. Christine Fair. Asian Survey Vol. 51, No. 1 (January/February 2011), pp. 97-110. Published by: University of California Press. Article DOI: 10.1525/as.2011.51.1.97. Article Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/as.2011.51.1.97
"Question: Qn12f." Gallup Brain. Gallup. Web. 14 Oct. 2011.
"U.S. Image in Pakistan Falls No Further Following Bin Laden Killing." Pew Research Center. 21 June 2011. Web. 14 Oct. 2011.
Nice topic Josh! This ties perfectly into the ideas of Putnam and you cover some key points on this issue that help explain the struggle for alliance with two vastly different objectives. Both Pakistan and the US have a lot to lose in this struggle and it is debatable what they gain from this. Can this situation be win-win? It is clear the US is not going to back down with mounting public pressure to end the war but can and will Pakistan cooperate with the US when they have a lot to lay on the line with foreign aid? This situation is always changing and evolving and it will be interesting to see how long this situation lasts before resolve.
ReplyDeleteJosh,
ReplyDeleteIn the case that you bring up, you mention that a variety of players are pressuring both the US and Pakistan in their every move. Although the US and Pakistan are faced with so many people to please, and this may slow down policy-decisions, I think win-set situations may be a good thing.
Win-sets, in my opinion, act as a form of checks and balances on a government. A state cannot just act in their best interest, but must also act in the best interest of the international community as well as its citizens. In Pakistan, which may not have the most democratic history, a politically stagnant situation due to win-set related issues may actually be a positive situation, in which the government must reflect on the needs of everyone, not just their own.
Haley: Thanks! I think there is an end situation that would benefit both the US and Pakistan, although it would be possibly the most difficult path to choose. Although many are critical of the amount of US foreign aid going to Pakistan, if Pakistan uses it wisely, the situation will dramatically be improved. Like I said, the US needs to understand that Pakistan has a different cultural mind set and other international worries that it places as higher priorities. Pakistan has, to some extent, already agreed that insurgents within its borders must be addressed, but not to the level that the US would like. As I mentioned, Pakistan still refuses to confront the largest insurgent network in Pakistan, the Haqqani network. If Pakistan used foreign aid to carry on missions against insurgents, it would be left to use its own resources and weight to address issues such as the border with India.
ReplyDeleteHannah: I would actually agree with you. It is widely known that an aspect of democracy that is often criticized is the pace at which the government can make decisions. However, the slower government moves, I believe, the less irrational it can act. However, this particular situation presents a rare aspect. The building discontent with the war in the Middle East, at least in the US, will eventually be too strong for the US to continue their efforts. If that happens before Pakistan full cooperates, then the US will more than likely deem the War on Terror a partial failure or only a partial success.
Josh this is really interesting. You talk about how Pakistan is "important" to the US because of its proximity and how we must have Pakistani cooperation. I'm curious of your thoughts on how Pakistan may have positively helped out/influenced the US currently or in the past during this "war". I mean, we do give them foreign aid among other things...
ReplyDeleteYou are absolutely right in pointing out that Pakistan has a different agenda than the US in this war on terror. The Pakistani government can not waste all of its resources and foreign aid on doing the United States military's bidding. However, as the Putnam article points out, international negotiations can change when you introduce other factors. Obviously, the way that the US has accused Pakistan of playing both sides did not work and only infuriated Pakistan more. So what must they do in order to make the Pakistani people and government want to fight these terrorists? First they have to change the Pakistani's peoples opinion on the United States, but what can be done; do you have any suggestions?
ReplyDelete