In 2001, people all around the world were shocked by the Anthrax attack that killed and caused illness in over 20 Americans. This type of attack can be categorized as a specific type of terrorism—Bioterrorism. Bioterrorism is the use of biological agents such as, viruses and other bacteria to cause harm to people, animals, or the environment. Not only does bioterrorism fall under the scope of terrorism in general, but it can also take the form of transnational crime, which is an incident that occurs across national borders and is considered criminal by two or more states (Naim 187). In the case of Anthrax, the biological agents entered the country through the mail, crossing national borders-- a blatant transnational crime. A specific type of transnational crime that relates quite closely to bioterrorism is, Transnational Environmental Crime (TEC). Highly threatening elements of TEC are the illegal trading of plants and animals (often endangered), natural resources, the moving and dumping of hazardous waste, and the smuggling of pollutants from one country into another (Elliot 502). Unfortunately, due to various aspects of states’ self-interest, TEC often goes ignored. In my opinion, however, it is in the best interest of governments to increase awareness of TEC and punishments for the perpetrators, or else TEC will have the chance to escalate and be utilized for major acts of bioterrorism.
Despite the dangerous implications of TEC, states shy away from harsh penalties for TEC because of their own economic benefits. Even in the UN’s Convention against Transnational Crime, the activities of timber and wildlife smuggling have mild punishments such as, four years or fewer of imprisonment for perpetrators (Elliot 515). It is thought that over half of the European Union’s timber is illegal logged. Because of the illegal timber trade, legitimate timber prices have skyrocketed, thus without this source of timber, the EU would be paying much higher prices for this resource. Although the smuggling of timber into the EU is technically illegal, it is considered licit because of the positive implications it has for the state itself (Schendel 20). In the face of bioterrorism, the populace should be wary of state economic self-interest in relation to TEC, and question the acceptance of this activity as licit.
Additionally, governments are hesitant to admit that TEC poses the same the security threats as other types of transnational crime. The illegal trading of drugs and arms as well as human trafficking endangers human populations and can cause a state’s government to become largely insecure (Elliot 511). Because violence is almost always a direct effect of these illegal transnational crimes, governments pay close attention to these issues. In 2002, the countries involved in the Declaration of Parties in the South China Sea made cooperative measures to lessen the transnational crimes of arms and drugs trafficking. Unfortunately, this transnational crime declaration (as well as many others) leaves out TEC (Elliot 512). States view drug, arms, and human trafficking as direct security threats to their welfare, while they do not view ecological threats in the same light even though environmental terrorism has the potential to be equally as harmful.
It is puzzling as to why states do not fear TEC as much as other types of environmental crime. Perhaps environmental crime is more abstract than other types of transnational crime, as it is difficult to imagine that the illegal logging and smuggling of timber, animals, and hazardous waste is facilitated by “criminal gangs” and poses a major threat to humanity’s well-being (Elliot 504, 509). Yet, this is dangerous naiveté considering how closely linked the health of the environment is with the health of the populace. This abstract and behind-the-scenes nature of TEC causes there to be less attention given to TEC by states even though it plagues the future of global environmental and economic integrity and safety. Unfortunately, by not placing a greater emphasis on the security threats of TEC, terrorists have the potential to utilize this backhand, under emphasized trade to launch attacks on innocent people.
There are a variety of ways in which TEC can transform into bioterrorism. Globalization aids in the ease of this transformation, as
“the intersection of the power of globalization with the threat of international
crime appears to confirm the darkest fears of policy makers, law enforcement officials, and average citizens of industrialized countries” (Schendel 3).
In this global era of ease of communication and travel, if the technology and means of trading hazardous waste falls into the wrong hands, this could be fatal to humanity. Aside from the smuggling of environmental goods and animals from country to country, much of what TEC does, involves the trade of hazardous waste. Although not caused by terrorists or transnational criminals, in the late 1970s in Niagra Falls, New York, hundreds of families had to be evacuated from the town after toxic chemicals were found in the Love Canal area of the Niagara Falls. These chemicals found their way into schools and homes causing burns, birth defects, and miscarriages. It took 21 years and $400 million to revitalize the town, and the toxic waste site in which the chemicals were derived (DePalma).
If, for example, transnational criminals or terrorists used the Colorado River as a dumping site for hazardous waste, this would be one of the most harmful bioterrorist attacks ever completed. The Colorado River supplies water for 3 million acres of farmland and 30 million people in the US and Mexico, if infected with toxic chemicals, incredible amounts of farmland and farm animals would be damaged as well as the people all around the country receiving their drinking water from the Colorado River (Matalon). There is chance for disaster if states continue to look past the links between the environment and society, such as the reliance of US citizens on the Colorado River.
Moreover, the Asian Longhorned Beetle was accidentally carried into the United States via wood in cargo shipments in 1996. The beetle then proceeded to destroy trees up and down the northern east coast of the US ("Plant Health, Plant Protection and Quarantine"). Again, this incident was not purposeful, however, if terrorists were given the means to do so, the transnational smuggling of animals across borders could be utilized to infect important ecological aspects of the US economy and society. By placing weak punishments and little attention on TEC, governments fail to consider the dependent relationship of the people and their surroundings.
For the sake of the environment, people, and state safety, it is urgent that new and innovative legal and legislative measures are created to curb TEC. States must put their self-interest aside and reconsider the direct security threats that arise from TEC because allowing this type of transnational crime is allowed to flourish causes the chance of bioterrorist attacks to increase. Terrorism hones in on society’s fears, and in order to combat terrorism, preparedness is key. Currently, the US and other countries around the world are not ready for a terrorist attack on the environment that causes harm to a staggering percentage of the population. However, with more of a focus on TEC, countries around the world have a higher probability of stopping the transformation of TEC to a form of bioterrorism.
Works Cited:
"CDC Bioterrorism Overview." CDC Emergency Preparedness & Response Site.
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 12 Feb. 2007. Web. 27 Oct. 2011.
DePalma, Anthony, and David Staba. "Love Canal Declared Clean, Ending Toxic Horror
- New York Times." The New York Times - Breaking News, World News &
Multimedia. The New York Times, 18 Mar. 2004. Web. 27 Oct. 2011.
Elliott, Lorraine. "Transnational environmental crime in the Asia Pacific: an
'un(der)securitized' security problem?." Pacific Review 20.4 (2007): 499-522.
Academic Search Premier. EBSCO. Web. 27 Oct. 2011.
Matalon, Lorne. "Colorado River Water Rights." PRI's The World. 9 Apr. 2010. Web. 27
Oct. 2011.
"Plant Health, Plant Protection and Quarantine." USDA - APHIS. 19 Aug. 2011. Web. 27
Oct. 2011.
Schendel, Willem Van, and Itty Abraham. Bloomington: Indiana University, 2005. Print.
"Transnational Organized Crime | National Institute of Justice." National Institute of
Justice: Criminal Justice Research, Development and Evaluation. Office of
Justice Programs, 15 Nov. 2007. Web. 27 Oct. 2011.
Hannah, I really enjoy the topic that you chose this week. Nearly not enough attention is given to the possibility of eco-terrorism. Maybe it is because the surge of the internet era has caused many to focus on and worry about information warfare and cyber terrorism as expressed in some of our readings a few weeks ago (specifically by Martin Vancrevelt and his argument on the transformation of war).
ReplyDeleteWith each transnational crime there is an objective/agenda for the perpetrators to achieve. These criminals take the extreme means that they do for money, land, power, fear, etc. Although environmental warfare is not as popular as a tactic, or maybe well known, the consequences as you point out are dire. The great example that was set in our Risk game that the anonymity and quickness with which biological warfare can be used against states are reasons enough to be worried about future transnational environmental crimes(TEC). However, to my knowledge, many terrorist groups do not commit which could be more detrimental to a states resources. Does this have to do with the idea that terrorists inflict terror to also gain media spotlight? I can't imagine that TEC get as much media coverage as actions taken by Al-Queda such as 9/11 and the London bombings. So basically my question is why dont terrorists use this option of biological warfare/TEC if both the consequences are detrimental and the states do not focus on TEC protection as much as they should?
Once again, great blog Hannah! Really interesting and insightful :)
Hannah,
ReplyDeleteYou're blog post, as Ryan just said, does an exceptional job of allowing some insight into the risks posed by potential TEC crimes. I do have a few comments/questions for you.
Your examples very powerfully demonstrate the consequences of a potential biological attack by terrorists. However, the aren't any examples of biological weapons actually being implemented by a terrorist organization. Indeed, I could not find any examples of such, although it was a quick search. My question for you, and possibly just a suggestion for though, is if there is a structural quality that has prevented non-state actors from forcibly exploiting biological weapons. Approaching the topic with a liberal view, is it possible that multi-lateral treaties regarding biological weapons have been completely successful?
One possible explanation I had, and I'd love to see whether or not you agreed, is if it is possible that terrorist networks have not utilized a biological weapon due to state's lack of reactions to such weapons. For example, for several decades most states have been wholly concerned with nuclear non-proliferation. It has also been the goal for several states to acquire nuclear weapons (North Korea, Iran.) Have biological weapons just been ignored because of the frenzy to possess nuclear weapons?
I hope my questions make sense! Great blog Hannah!
Ryan,
ReplyDeleteI think that the means of transnational environmental crime have not yet fallen into the hands of terrorists, but I think there is much potential for this to happen. TEC is much more discrete than say, the 9/11 attacks. Like you said, terrorists often want as much media attention as possible, and become of the secrecy of TEC, it is possible that it is less of a desirable measure for terrorists to take.
However, I predict that if terrorists learn about and gain interest in TEC, they may be able to transform elements of what transnational environmental criminals do into acts of bioterrorism that attract media attention all around the world.
Hey Josh,
ReplyDeleteYour questions make a lot of sense and are really interesting! I’ll just run through and answer them in order.
I think non-state actors have been inhibited from forcibly exploiting biological weapons not due to a structural quality, but more due to accessibility. Because states focus so little on TEC and its potential threats and many multi-lateral treaties about transnational crime overlook TEC and its bioterrorist implications, I do not think they are as prepared as they should be for biologically terrorist attacks. Because of states lack of preparation, it is odd as to why terrorists have not taken advantage of this means of attack. To answer your question, I think that acquiring biological technology is difficult because it takes a lot of scientific knowledge. For example, I read somewhere that a terrorist could destroy almost the entire population if he or she placed the small pox virus in Times Square. However, recreating the small pox virus and gaining the materials to do so is a task that even the most skilled doctors and scientists would struggle to do. So, I think terrorists have not used this means because of the scientific difficulty less so because of state structures or multi-lateral treaties.
You are correct; terrorists may also decide not to use biological means of terrorism because states do not seem as afraid of bioterror as they are of nuclear terror. As I mentioned in my paper, terrorists hone in on fear, and use whatever it takes to instill the most fear in a population. Because, as you said, there is a “nuclear frenzy,” terrorists may be utilizing nuclear weapons rather than biological weapons to impose as much fear as possible on society. In this way, maybe it is better if states remain calm about TEC and bioterrorism because then terrorists may be less likely to engage in this type of terrorism.
Hey Hannah, I really like your blog post. It clearly connected what we experienced in the Risk game with what we talked about this week. My question relates to a lot of the things brought up by Ryan and Josh...
ReplyDeleteDo you think States are smart in focusing on things like nuclear terrorism and suicide bombers since they are the most common threat? It seems like transnational environmental crimes and biological weapons are far more difficult to create, and require much more education and planning than current threats. There haven't been any real threats from terrorist groups using TEC methods, so should the governments be focused on it?
Hannah,
ReplyDeleteWhat do you propose by "maybe its better is states remain calm about TEC..."? Are you saying that the government should not place a lot of emphasis on them or raise public awareness about them, because then terrorist would be more likely to use them?
Also how you would explain the fact that TECs are not widely used be states as a weapon, if they are so damaging? For example the use of the beetle could cause severe economic damage to a country and would be difficult to trace back to its roots.